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Abstract 
'Paradoxes of material implication' is a significant topic in modern symbolic and mathematical logic. Various attempts 
have been taken to resolve these paradoxes. Thus, a number of schools of logic have been developed in this regard. In 
our present paper we examine three of the main schools of modern logic which deal with these paradoxes: many-
valued logic, modal logic and relevance logic. Three-valued logic, which is a kind of many:valued logic, fails to show 
any promise in resolving these paradoxes as it adopts the entire truth table based on traditional bivalence. Five-valued 
logic, another kind of many-valued logic, shows some promises in resolving these paradoxes. But it destroys the 
system of propositional calculus and the process of judging the validity/invalidity of arguments. So it is difficult to accept 
this solution with such a price. Modal logic, the second approach discussed in this paper, resolves these paradoxes by 
introducing the device of strict implication. But the problem is that it creates some new paradoxes, namely paradoxes of 
strict implication, which are analogous to the paradoxes of material implication. Hence modal logic is also not adequate. 
Relevance logic, however, resolves these paradoxes without creating any new paradox. It does not destroy the system 
of propositional calculus or the process of judging the validity/invalidity of arguments. Hence, relevance logic solves the 
problems of the logic of implication. Although there are some minor difficulties in relevance logic, we hope that more 
work in this area will resolve these problems soon, so that relevance logic will provide a fully adequate logic of 
implication. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Paradoxes of Material Implication 
In symbolic logic, · there are four types of compound statements of which 
conditional statement is more attention grabbing for its comparatively complex 
structure and truth value. A compound statement that has at least two 
components that have a relation among them such that one component 
apparently deduces the other is a conditional statement. That is, in conditional 
statement two components are conditional to each other. Thus the compound 
statement 'If it rains, then there will be a flood ' is a conditional statement, since it 
carries two components that have conditional relation. The component that 
stands prior to 'then' is the antecedent (the implying statement), and the 
component that stands behind 'then' is the consequent (the implied statement). 
We should note that the antecedent and consequent, as components of 
compound statement, are statements in their own right. In symbolic logic, 
conditional statements are also called 'hypothetical statements', 'implicative 
statements' or simply 'implications'. My observation is that most logicians simply 
use the term 'implications'. And that's why, in this paper, I will use the term 
'implication' for conditional statement. 
Some problems regarding the implication were detected by ancient and medieval 
logicians. 1 These problems are categorized as paradoxes of material implication 
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(PMI). In the first three sections of this introduction, we will discuss various types 
of implications, material implication and the nature of the PMI, respectively. It 
should be noted here that although PMI were detected by ancient and medieval 
logicians, no significant development occurred in these periods regarding the 
issue. In the beginning of twentieth century logicians have returned to the issue, 
and discovered that one of the main sources of the PMI is that the antecedent of 
implicative statements sometimes does not entail the consequent. If the 
antecedent does entail the consequent, then most of the paradoxes can be 
resolved. So, the idea of entailment is important here. In the fourth section of this 
chapter we will discuss the idea of entailment as well as its relation to material 
implication. And in the fifth section of this chapter a general overview of this 
research paper will be given. 
1.1 Different Types of Implications: There are various types of implications. Let 
us take a look at the compound statement 'If ABC is a triangle, then it has three 
sides ' . The consequent of this implication follows from the antecedent by the 
definition of 'triangle'. We call it definitional implication. Another statement 'If all 
humans are mortal and Socrates is human, then Socrates is mortal' can be 
examined now. Its consequent follows from the antecedent not by the definition of 
human, but by the logical inference from the antecedent. We call it logical 
implication. Implications which denote causal connection are labeled as causal 
implication. Thus the implicative statement 'If there is smoke, then there is fire', 
asserting causal connection between smoke and fire, is a causal implication. The 
Page-2 
fourth kind of implication is neither definitional, nor is it logical or causal. This is a 
type of implication which reports a decision of the speaker to behave in the 
specified way in the specified circumstances. This kind of implications is termed 
as decisional implication. Thus the implicative statement 'If you get good grades 
in your exams, I will give you a nice shirt as a gift' is an example of decisional 
implicative statement by which the speaker reports his decision to behave in a 
specified way if the antecedent condition is fulfilled.2 There is a fifth kind of 
implication. This type of implication does not claim any real connection between 
antecedent and consequent. We use this sort of implication in our everyday 
conversation as a method of denying the truth of the antecedent by uttering an 
obviously false consequent. In Copi's words "This sort of conditional is ordinarily 
intended as an emphatic or humorous method of denying the truth of its 
antecedent, for it typically contains a notoriously or ridiculously false statement as 
its consequent."3 Thus the statement 'If Jones is a logician, then I am a monkey' 
is an example of this sort of implication. The speaker of this statement wants to 
state that Jones is not a logician, since he (the speaker) is obviously not a 
monkey. That is, the speaker of this statement asserts that since the consequent 
of this statement is false, the antecedent cannot be true. we can namb this kind 
of implication reductio implication. 
Definitional, logical , causal or decisional implications pronounce that the 
antecedent is sufficient to produce the consequent. More simply, the antecedent 
is sufficient for the consequent. We can express this assertion in terms of truth 
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value in this way: all kinds of implications assert that if its antecedent is true, then 
its consequent must be true also. Thus if the antecedent is true and the 
consequent is true, then the implication is true. And if the antecedent is true but 
the consequent is false, then the implication is false. Fc;>r example, if the 
antecedent 'If it rains' of the implication 'If it rains, then there will be a flood' is 
true, and the consequent of this implication 'There will be a flood' is also true, 
then the whole implication is true. But if the antecedent 'If it rains' is true where 
the consequent 'There will be a flood' is false, then the whole implication is false. 
Now if we symbolize the antecedent as p and the consequent as q, then the 
implicative statement would be symbolized as p:::::Jq, which means 'If p, then q'. 
So, at this moment we are in a position to construct the following truth table: 
p q p:::::Jq 
T T T 
T F F 
Table 1 
But that is not all. From the fourth century B.C., we have known that truth and 
falsehood may be distributed in four ways between two propositions. Philo of 
Megara introduced this idea.4 According to this idea, the truth value between two 
propositions may be distributed in the following four ways: 
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Either both of them are true 
or, the first proposition is true and the second proposition is false, 
or, the first proposition is false and the second proposition is true, 
or, both of the propositions are false. 
So the truth table for the implication, p=:>q, must be a four-row truth table. But 
Table-1 is a two-row truth table. It includes only the first two ways of Philonian 
distribution of truth value between two propositions p (antecedent) and q 
(consequent). Now, let us try to construct a four-row truth table for p=:>q. 
p q p=:>q 
T T T 
T F F 
F T ? 
F F ? 
Table- 2 
The ideas of definitional, logical, causal or decisional implicatio'ls are not 
sufficient to determine the truth value of p=:>q in row-3 and in row-4, because in 
these cases the antecedents are false. But we cannot leave these rows blank, 
since from the principle of excluded middle we know that any statement is either 
true or false. And, of course, we cannot insert both of the truth values T and F in 
these rows, since it will be a violation of the principle of contradiction (sometimes 
called 'the principle of non-contradiction) which asserts that no statement can be 
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both true and false. Thus to satisfy the principle of excluded middle and the 
principle of contradiction, we must add truth values for p~q in row-3 and row-4 
and that truth value will be either true or false, not both. Now the question is how 
can we determine truth values for p~q for the row-3 and row-4? The idea of 
reductio implication helps us to complete the truth table for implication. We have 
seen that by uttering a reductio implication speaker asserts that since the 
consequent of that implication is false, the antecedent cannot be true. We can 
translate this view with a little bit technical expression as: 'it is not the case that 
the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false'. If it happens so, that is, if we 
find for a given implicative statement that its antecedent is true but its consequent 
is false, then the given implicative statement will be a false one. Otherwise the 
statement is true. Thus the third and fourth rows of the truth table have the truth 
value T in their final column. Hence the complete truth table for the implication 
will be as follow: 
p q p~q 
T T T 
T F F 
F T T 
F F T 
Table 3 
This table helps us to understand implication and its truth functional nature. Logic 
is the study of inference, and implication is one of the most central concepts of 
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inference. Implication is also an important concept in mathematics and many 
other formal sciences, and so it is important for logicians to understand 
implication. Thus it is very important to understand implication. This table also 
represents the truth functionality of the implication. It is easily noticed that the 
truth value of an implication depends only on the truth values of the constituent 
atomic statements, not on their meaning or material facts. Logic is not 
metaphysics, nor is it a material science. It is a formal science, and as a formal 
science logic is concerned with general patterns of inference, not with the 
particular object or particular fact. In other words, logic does not deal with the 
content of statements. Rather, it deals with truth functional relationship among 
the constituent parts of its compound statements. This truth functional 
characteristic of logic allows it to develop various rigorous tools and axioms. 
That's why it is important to use truth functional logic in understanding 
implications. 
1.2 Material Implication: Material implication is not merely another kind of 
implication. The various kinds of implication, discussed above, are various types 
of speech acts indeed. But material implication is not a speech act. Rather, it is 
different level of idea about implicative statements. According to this idea an 
implication does not claim any 'real' connection between antecedent and 
consequent. In other words, no internal connection between antecedent and 
consequent is required here. The so-called relation between antecedent and 
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consequent of an implication can only be described by the phrase 'as a matter of 
fact'. Thus whatever type of implication it is, the meaning of the implication is that 
'as a matter of fact, it is not the case that the antecedent is true, but the 
consequent is false'. This meaning of implication is termed as material 
implication. Bertrand Russell has given this name to it.5 Thus the meaning of 
material implication is the whole meaning of reductio implication, and it is the 
partial common meaning of every types of implications discussed above. We can 
examine the causal implication 'If it rains, then there will be a flood.' In what 
circumstances will we agree that this causal implication is false? Well, if there is 
rain (true antecedent) but there is no flood (false consequent), then we will agree 
that the causal implication 'If it rains, then there will be a flood' is false. That is, 
the meaning of material implication, i.e. 'as a matter of fact, it is not the case that 
the antecedent is true but the consequent is false' is equally applicable to causal 
implication. It can also be shown that like causal implication, definitional 
implication, logical implication, and decisional implication also contain this 
meaning. Thus the truth condition of material implication captures the common 
truth functional meaning of all types of implications. 
Hence logicians, in standard logic, consider the phrase 'If- then' in the sense of 
material implication, so that it can cover every types of implications. So, the 
symbol '=>' (horseshoe) means 'materially implies'. In other words p=:>q means 'p 
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materially implies q', no matter what type of implication is symbolized as p-::::::>q. 
And, in relevance to the truth value, p-::::::>q means-
As a matter of fact it is not the case that p is true and q is false 
Or, It is not the case that p is true and q is false 
Or, it is not the case that p and not- q 
Or, it is not the case that p . ,..., q 
And, more symbolically, - (p • ,..., q) 
That is, p-::::::>q means -(p.- q). Of course, p-::::::>q may also be translated as ,...,pvq, 
which means 'either p is false or q is true'. The following truth table, however, 
shows the equivalence among p-:::::;;q, -(p. -q) and -pvq 
p q p:::=Jq -(p.-q) -p v q 
1 T T T T T 
2 T F F F F 
3 F T T T T 
4 F F T T T 
Table 4 
1.3 Paradoxes of Material Implication: The truth table (table-3 or table-4) for 
material implication is attention grabbing. Here row-1 and row-3 assert that 'a true 
statement is implied by any statement whatever', and row-3 and row-4 assert that 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
'a false statement implies any statement whatever'. Thus the statement 'If p is 
false, then (if p then q) is true' [in symbolic formulation: -p=>(p=>q)] becomes a 
logical truth, incapable of being false according to the truth functional 
interpretation. Again, 'If q is true, then (if p, then q) is true' [in symbolic 
formulation: q=>(p=>q)] is logically necessary according to the same interpretation. 
The following truth table indicates the logical truth of these two statements: 
p q -p p=>q -p ~(p => q) q => (p => q) (-p => (p ~ q)) = (q => (p => q)) 
T T F T T T T 
T F F F T T T 
F T T T T T T 
F F T T T T T ... 
Table 5 
Although the above truth table displays the logical necessity of the statements 
-p.=; (p=>q) and q=>(p=>q) from the truth functional interpretation of standard logic, 
l 
many logicians treat these statements paradoxical. These are paradoxical, 
because either these statements imply conflicting statements or they are implied 
by conflicting statements. Logicians label these paradoxes as paradoxes of 
material implication. Some non-symbolic concrete example may help us to 
understand these paradoxes. Let us take the statements: 
(i) If 2+2=5, then the earth is round 
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(ii) If 2+2=5, then the earth is not round 
Both of these statements are true since the antecedent '2+2=5' is false. Suppose 
that 'the earth is round' is true. So, the statement (i) is true (indicated by row-3; F 
T ~ T), and the statement (ii) is true either (indicted by row-4; F F ~ T). And if 
the statement 'the earth is round' is false, the statement (i) will be true (indicated 
by row-4; F F ~ T) and also the statement (ii) will be true (indicated by row-3; F T 
~ T). That is, a false statement (in this example: 2+2=5) implies any statement 
whatever in a true implication. In other words, the false statement '2+2=5' implies 
both of the conflicting statements 'the earth is round' and 'the earth is not round' 
at the same time and place. This is some what paradoxical to many logicians. 
Again, similarly, the statements-
(iii) If Bangladesh is in Asia, then a triangle has three sides 
(iv) If Bangladesh is not in Asia, then a triangle has three sides 
are both true since the consequent 'a triangle has three sides' is true, no matter 
\ 
whether 'Bangladesh is in Asia' is true or false. Suppose, 'Bangladesh is in Asia' 
is false, still the implication is true which is indicated by row-3 (F T ~ T). And, if 
'Bangladesh is in Asia' is true, then also the implication is true which is indicated 
by row-1 (T T ~ T). That is, a true statement (in this example: a triangle has 
three sides) is implied by any statement whatever in a true implication. In other 
words, the true statement 'a triangle has three sides' is implied by both of the 
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conflicting statements 'Bangladesh is in Asia' and 'Bangladesh is not in Asia' at 
the same time and place. Again, this is somewhat paradoxical to many logicians. 
There is another type of paradox concerning material implication. Sometimes, in 
material implication a contradictory antecedent implies a co'nsequent. In other 
words, material implication involves contradiction in it although standard logic is 
committed to preserve the law of non-contradiction. Again I would like to analyze 
this paradox with a concrete example. Consider the statement, 'if America attacks 
Iran and America does not attack Iran, then the price of oil will raise'. The truth 
functional interpretation of material implication confirms the truth of this statement 
although it involves the contradiction-'America attacks Iran and America does 
not attack Iran'. In symbolic formulation the concerning statement form will be like 
this, (p.-p)-::::Jq. The following truth table proves the necessity of this implication-
p q 
-p (p.-p }::::Jq 
T T F T 
T F F T 
F T T T 
F F T T 
Table 6 
We know any statement of the form (p.-p) breaks the law of contradiction and 
hence it is simply inconsistent. It is not sensible that an inconsistent statement 
implies something consistent. On the contrary, many logicians think that 'a 
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contradiction 'spreads' to every proposition, and simple inconsistency is 
equivalent to absolute inconsistency.'6 Thus the implication of the form (p.-p}=>q 
is another kind of paradox of material implication. Logicians call this paradox ex 
fa/so quodlebet. 
So, up to this discussion, we have found three paradoxes in material implications. 
These are: -p ~ (p =::> q), q =::> (p =::> q), and (p.-p)=::>q. But these are not all. There 
are lots of paradoxes in material implications. The more we examine, the longer 
will be the list of paradoxes. Among them the following three PMI are well-
known-
1 . p=::>( q=::>p) [positive paradox] 
2. p===>(-p===>q) [negative paradox] 
3. (p.-p)=::>q [ex fa/so quodlebet] 
One thing should be noted here that while we discuss about the PMI, we use the 
\ 
term 'paradox' in a wider sense. The term "paradox" (in logic) is defined in Oxford 
English dictionary as: "A statement or proposition which, from an acceptable 
premise and despite sound reasoning, leads to a conclusion that is against 
sense, logically unacceptable, or self-contradictory; freq. distinguished by name, 
esp. of its profounder, or of the type of problem it raises." Now, we see, the PMI 
are only paradoxes in the wide construal of being 'against sense', they are not 
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'logically unacceptable' or 'self-contradictory'. 7 The main problem they bear is that 
they do not match with our commonsense intuitions. We, of course, do not argue 
that every logically true statement must go with our commonsense intuitions. But 
it will be more adequate logic of implication if they go with commonsense 
intuition. From this point of view we are looking for a system of implication which 
is free from the PM I. 
1.4 Entailment: The above mentioned paradoxes of material implications are not 
new discoveries to logicians. They have been discussing and trying to solve 
these paradoxes along with some other problems of standard logic for centuries. 
In the modern period G.E Moore, a friend and colleague of Bertrand Russell, also 
involved himself in the problems of material implication. He introduced the idea of 
entailment and uses the term 'entail' instead of 'imply'. The term entail is used to 
indicate implication where the antecedent and consequent are relevant to each 
other. Professor Moore says "We shall then be able to say truly that "p entails q", 
when and only when we are able to say truly that "q follows from: p" or "is 
deducible from" , in the sense in which the conclusion of a syllogism in Barbara 
follows from the two premisses, taken as one conjunctive proposition; or in which 
the proposition 'This is coloured' follows from 'this is red.' 'p entails q' will be 
related to 'q follows from p' in the same way in which 'A is greater than B' is 
related to '8 is less than A.' " 8 Moore uses the symbol ent. for entailment. Thus 'p 
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entails q' is symbolized as 'p ent. q'. In case of entailment, we see, an internal 
relation, i.e. relevance, between antecedent and consequent is required. 
Because of this relevance 'this is red' entails the consequent 'this is colored'. One 
thing cannot be red without being colored. Or, one thing is obviously colored if it 
is red. There is an internal relation between antecedent and consequent in this 
sort of implication. Again, because of the lack of relevance 'this is red' does not 
entail 'Socrates is mortal'. There is no relevance between something's redness 
and Socrates' mortality. Moore expresses this sort of propositions with regard to 
their properties. Thus any proposition asserting that a given thing that it has the 
property P entails the proposition that thing in question also has the property Q, 
can be re expressed as xP entails xQ, which means in Moore's words " 'xP 
entails xQ' is to be true, if and only if the proposition 'AP entails AQ' is true, and if 
also all propositions which resemble this, in the way in which 'BP entail BQ' 
resembles it, are true also; where 'AP means the same as 'A has P', 'AQ' the 
same as 'A has Q' etc. etc."9 Now, according to Moore, logicians falsely infer that 
since it is natural to express that xP * xQ (Moore uses the sy~bol '*' for 
Russell ian symbol ':::>') by 'If anything has P, then that thing has Q', it is natural to 
express AP * AQ by 'If AP, then AQ' and consequently, 'AP implies AQ'. Moore 
considers that if it is the reason to express 'p * q' by 'p implies q', then it is 
obviously a fallacious reasoning. 10 But he fears that a good number of logicians 
have been considering it true, since it is said by Bertrand Russell. Moore 
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comments that it is an 'enormous howler' of logicians. He says "But I imagine that 
Mr. Russell himself would now be willing to admit that, so far from being true, the 
statement that 'q can be deduced from p' means the same as 'p * q' is simply an 
'h I ' II 11 enormous ower . 
Whether it is an 'enormous howler' or not, it is clear, from the above discussion 
that entails and (materially) implies are different relations. The relation (entails) 
that holds between 'This is red' and "This is coloured' is quite different from the 
relation (implication) that holds between 'It is Monday' and 'Socrates is 
philosopher'. To say 'This is red' is to admit that 'It is coloured'. In other words, 'it 
could not be true that this is red and yet false that this is coloured'. That is, 'p 
entails q' means 'It could not be the case that p is true and q is false'. On the 
other hand, to say that 'It is Monday' is not to admit that 'Socrates is a 
philosopher'. It can be happen that today is Monday, but Socrates is not a 
philosopher. The relation between 'Today is Monday' and 'Socrates is a 
philosopher' is a 'as a matter of fact' relation. That is, 'p (materially)\ implies q' 
means 'It is not as a matter of fact the case that p is true and q is false'. The 
difference between 'could not be' and 'is not as a matter of fact' is obviously a 
significant difference between these two types of relations. Lord Susan Stebbing 
explains it in this way: "[l]f 'p ent. q' means 'p could not be true and q false', then 
there is between p and q a relation such that q follows logically or formally from p. 
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No matter what p and q may be, if 'p ent. q', then q can be formally deduced from 
p. If 'p * q' means 'p is not as a matter of fact true and q false', then there is not 
such a relation between p and q that q can be formally deduced from p." 12 
Thus, we see, the idea of entailment is different from the idea of material 
implication. In the case of entailment the antecedent and consequent should 
have a relation between them which makes the one a consequent of the other. 
But in the case of material implication, no such relation between antecedent and 
consequent is required, i.e. only truth values matter here. All entailments truth 
functionally involve material implications, but not all material implications involve 
entailment. Entailment restricts the scope of material implication where there is 
no 'real connection' or relevance between antecedent and consequent. This lack 
of relevance is one of the main sources of PM I. In other words, our classical logic 
of material implication falls short of the important concept of entailment, and 
because of this shortcoming it contains several paradoxes. Thus, to avoid the 
PMI, we need to develop a logic of implication grounded in tHe idea of 
entailment. 
1.5 Overview of the Thesis: Our aim in this research is to find a system of logic 
which is free from the PMI, and which is grounded in the idea of entailment. Thus 
an adequate logic of implication must fulfill two criteria-(1) no PMI will be a 
formula in this system, and (2) the antecedent of an implication, in this system, 
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must entail the consequent. In other words, there must be relevance between 
antecedent and consequent in any true implication. There are various schools of 
logic which have been developed to deal with the problem of PMI. In this 
research paper we would like to focus on three of these main schools of logic. 
These are many-valued logic, modal logic and relevance logic. We will discuss 
these schools of logic in chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively, and try to find out 
whether they fulfill our criteria. In the fifth and final chapter of this paper we will 
look back to the whole discussion and try to find out which one of these schools, 
if there is any, is free from PM I fulfilling the aforementioned criteria. 
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Chapter 2 
Many Valued Logic 
Many-valued logics are logical calculi which reject the classical bivalence that 
there are two possible truth values-true and false-for any proposition. Many-
valued logics explore the possibility that some propositions may be neither true 
nor false. Thus it allows more than two truth values for any proposition. But the 
law of excluded middle asserts that anything must be either A or not-A. In other 
words, any proposition must be either true or false, and there is no third option for 
a proposition but being either true or false. Thus most many-valued logics 
emerge by rejecting the law of excluded middle, although there are very few 
exceptions. 13 It should be noted that 'many-valued logics' is not a unique system 
of logic. Rather, it is a set of various systems of logic. Each element of this set is 
a logical system that contains more than two values for any proposition. The 
nature and amount of values varies from author to author according to their 
motivation. So, there are three-valued logic, four-valued logic, five-valued logic 
and so on. Of course, none of these schools of many-valued logic emerged as 
direct response to the PMI. But some schools of many valued logic show some 
promise in resolving the PMI as they introduce different types of truth tables by 
rejecting traditional bivalence. In this chapter we will discuss many-valued logic 
and its usefulness in resolving the PMI along with the historical background of 
many-valued log1c. 
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2.1 Historical Background: Many-valued logic was introduced as a response to 
Aristotelian idea about future contingent statements found in his treatise De 
fnterpretatione. Aristotelian example of future contingent statement is: 'There will 
be a sea-battle tomorrow.' when it has not yet been determined whether there will 
or not will be really a sea-battle tomorrow. The statement is, then, not yet actually 
true or actually false but potentially either. Epicureans took this idea and rejected 
the traditional of bivalence which states that every proposition must be either true 
or false. Medieval logicians took the matter again and some of them develop the 
idea of neuter. They maintain that future contingent statements are neuters, that 
is, these statements are neither true nor false. Then the three-valued logic 
(many-valued logic) emerged which asserted three values-true, false and the 
neuter. The main advocate of this many-valued logic was Peter de Rivo. 14 Emil 
Post ( 1897-1954) is one of the first to study many-valued logic in the 
contemporary period (early 20th century). The other is Jan t.ukasiewicz (1878-
1956). Post's many-valued logic is entirely formaL On the other hand, 
Lukasiewicz introduces his many-valued logic for philosophical reasons to 
provide a more appropriate representation for the indeterminacy of the future. 15 
Other logicians, like Moh shaw-Kwei, Kleene, Bochvar contributed a lot to this 
area of logic. They developed several many-valued matrixes in order to establish 
the independent axioms in a formal calculus. The number of values in those 
matrixes varies from three to various infinite sets. It is not possible to discuss all 
of those many-valued logics in this paper. To serve our purpose, we will discuss 
on1y t.ukasiew1cz s many-valued logic with special emphasis on his three-valued 
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logic and a five-valued logic described by Charles G. Morgan as representative 
works in this area. 
2.2 t.ukasiewicz's ·Many-valued Logic: In 1920 tukasiewicz published two 
books under the titles 0 Pojeciu Mozliwosci (On the Concept of Possibility) and 0 
Logice Trojwartosciowej (On Three-valued Logic) in which he originated his 
many-valued logic. He introduces a third truth value-possibility-which can be 
ascribed to statements about future events. tukasiewicz rejects the law of 
excluded middle, as he establishes a logic containing more than two truth values 
instead of conventional bivalence. He calls his logic 'many-valued logic' instead 
of 'non-Aristotelian logic', because it is not clear that Aristotle himself considered 
the law of excluded middle to be universally valid. We find statements in 
Aristotle 's writings which suggest that the law of excluded middle is not applicable 
to the statements about the future. On the other hand, Chrysippus, a stoic 
logician, strongly argued in favor of the universaiity of the law of excluded middle. 
That's why tukasiewicz called many-valued logic 'non-Chrysippean logic' rather 
than non-Aristotelian. 16 tukasiewicz introduces a special notation, often called 
Polish notation, for his logic. It is a parenthesis and punctuation free notation 
system where the functors are always written before wff. Thus Np corresponds to 
-p, Cpq to p=:Jq, Apq to pvq, Kpq to p•q and Epq to p=q. Any functor or operator 
(N. A. C. l<. E) standing ior binary logical operators has as its scope the first two 
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wff immediately following it. Thus the wff p=>(q=>p) and P=>(-p=>q) can be re-
expressed in Polish notation as CpCqp and CpCNpq respectively. 
Another thing should be mentioned here once again that the number of values in 
many-valued logics ranges from three to various infinite sets. Thus t.ukasiewicz 
uses the expression Ln in his many-valued logic where n stands for the number of 
values which the variables of calculus range over. So, L2 indicates the standard 
propositional calculus containing the bivalence, true and false, whereas l3 
indicates three-valued logic, l4 indicates four-valued logic and so on. For fixed 
finite n, the n values of Ln are taken for convenience as n members of the set 
V = {-i -} where 0 ~ i ~ n - 1 i = 0 and i = n- 1 establish that 0 and 1 are 
II J1 -1 7 
elements of every set V,, . Now, if there is more than two values in a many-valued 
logic, the set of values will consist of a set of n rational functions with 0 and 1 as 
end points. For example, in case of L3 , L.11, L5 the sets of values will 
beV3 = {O,,Y;,l}, V. = {0,/j,?:j,l}, V5 = {O,~,X,_% ,l}respectivelywhere .X and ;Y.; are 
replaced by 1. Defining V,, as a set of n rational functions is entirely a 
conventional way of defining it which facilitates the use of algebraic techniques in 
proving meta- theorems about the Ln. 17 So, there are different matrixes for 
different numbers of values. In the next section , we will discuss t.ukasiewicz's 
matrix of l3 as a representative model of three-valued log1c. 
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t.ukasiewicz's L3 Matrix: Lukasiewicz introduces the third value 'intermediate', 
or 'neutral ', or 'indeterminate' to face the problem of future contingent statements. 
Future contingent statements which are, in his opinion, neither true nor false, 
must have a third value other then true or false. In Lukasiewicz's words, 
"Therefore, the proposition considered is at the moment neither true nor false and 
must posses a third value, different from '0' or falsity and '1' or truth. This value 
we can designate by /i . It represents 'the possible' , and joins 'the true' and 'the 
false' as a third value. The three-valued system of propositional logic owes its 
origin to this line of thought."18 The following truth tables represent Lukasiewicz's 
line of thought regarding his three-valued logic. 
N 1 A 1 /i 0 K 1 /i 0 c 1 ~ 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 /i 0 1 1 ~ 0 
0 1 /i 1 /i /i )'i ~ ~ 0 li 1 1 li 
Y: ~ 0 1 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
I I 
' Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 
Here table 1 is for negation, table 2, table 3 and table 4 are for disjunction, 
conjunction and implication respectively. Now, we see, the conjunction takes the 
minimu m value of the conjuncts while disjunction takes the maximum value of the 
disjuncts. In case of implication , the table describes that the conditional is false 
only when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. And an implication 
is indeterminate when anteceaent is true and consequent is indeterminate, or 
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when the antecedent is indeterminate and the consequent is false. The rational 
for these choices are that (i) when the antecedent is true and the consequent is 
indeterminate, the implication could be true if the consequent were true, and it 
could be false if the consequent were false, (ii) when the antecedent is 
indeterminate and the consequent is false, the implication could be true if the 
antecedent were false, and it could be false if the antecedent were true. The table 
for C, thus, makes 'If p then q' true as long as q is no further from truth than p is 
which preserves the natural idea that a true implication will not lead us away from 
such truth as we already have. 19 These truth tables reject the law of excluded 
middle and the law of non-contradiction as well. The calculus, by which the law of 
excluded middle is rejected, is: 
Law of excluded middle: pv-p 
In Polish notation: ApNp 
=A ,li N Yz 
=A ~ )ti 
= ~ (indeterminate) 
And the calculus, by which the law of non-contradiction is rejected, is: 
Law of non-contradiction: p.-p 
In Polish notation: NKpNp 
=NK Ji N X 
= NK ;i ~ 
= )~ (i naetermrnate ). 
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Of course, these tables do not falsify the law of excluded middle or the law of 
non-contradiction. These two laws are turned into indeterminate where as these 
are true for their every substitution instances in standard two-valued logic. In fact, 
no law of standard logic are ever actually false in t.ukasiewicz's many-valued 
logic. Some of the laws of standard logic, of course, are sometimes turned into 
neuter or indeterminate in t.ukasiewicz's many-valued logic. 20 
L3 and the Paradoxes of Material Implication: Three-valued logic (or many-
valued logic in general) did not emerge as a response to the paradoxes of 
material implication (PMI). Rather, it was introduced as a response to Aristotelian 
ideas about future contingent statements. Thus, we do not find any direct attempt 
to resolve the PMI in the L3 system. Of course, the rejection of the law of 
excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction in L3 system is sometimes 
considered as an advance in finding the solution to the PMI. This rejection of 
these two laws are advance, regarding the solution of the PMI, in the sense that 
due to these two laws we have been obligated to add t ruth values-true, false-
in th e rows 3 and 4 of the table 3 in the first chapter (section 1 ), and these two 
truth values (row 3 and row 4 in table 3, chapter 1, section 1) cause the 
paradoxes. But the rejection of the law of excluded middle, the law of non-
contradiction and the introduction of the third value 'indeterminate' is not enough 
to resolve th e problem regarding PMI. If we take a closer look at the truth table 
for implication in l3 system, we fi nd that it preserves the intact truth table of 
implication of conventional bivalence used in standard two-valued logic which is. 
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in fact, the cause of above mentioned paradoxes. The following truth tables 
disclose this feature of l3 system: 
1 1 
0 1 
Table 5 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Table 6 
0 
0 ' Yz . 
1 1 
Yz 1 
It is clearly seen in the above tables that the whole content of the table 5 of 
standard logic is contained in the table 6 of t.ukasiewicz's three-valued logic. As a 
result L3 system also contains all the PM I. For example, we can consider here the 
positive paradox (the first of the PMI in our list, Chapter 1, Section 1 ). The 
statement p::::>( q::::>p ), which represents the positive paradox, can be translated into 
Polish notation as CpCqp. It can have nine (3n=3x3=9, 3 is the number of values 
and n is the number of components) different substitution instances with different 
combinations of truth values. Now, we can construct the following calculi for each 
of the substitution instances of CpCqp: 
CpCqp = C1 C11 = C11 = 1 
= C1 C01 = C11 = 1 
=C1C .~ 1 =C11= 1 
= coc 1 0 = coo = 1 
[when p=1 and q=1] 
[when p=1 and q=O] 
[when p=1 and q=)!;] 
[when p=O and q=1] 
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= co c X o = co X = 1 
= CO COO = C01 = 1 
=C X c1 X =C XX =1 
=C X CXX =C X 1 =1 
= c X co X = c X 1 = 1 
[when p=O and q= Yz ] 
[when p=O and q=O] 
[when p= Yz and q=1] 
[when p= Yz and q= Yz] 
[when p= X and q=O] 
Thus, we see, for every substitution instance, the truth value of CpCqp is 1, it is 
necessarily true. In other words, like standard logic the positive paradox, CpCqp, 
is a theorem in L3 system also. It can also be shown by constructing similar 
calculi that other PMI are also theorems in L3 system. Hence we do not find any 
solution of the PMI in t.ukasiewicz's three-valued logic. 
Although three-valued logic does not solve the PMI, its role in this regard is not 
negligible. Three-valued logic is significant from a historical perspective. By 
rejecting the law of excluded middle. the law of non-contradiction and the 
conventional bivalence as well , three-valued originates other many-valued logics, 
such as four-valued logic, f ive-valued logics and so on , in which we can observe 
some at least indirect attempts of resolving the PMI. Moreover, three-valued logic 
opens the door to modal logic by establishing the theory that plain true and false 
a re not the on ly t ruth va lues for a given statement. And it must be noted here that 
modal log1c has some di rect invo lvement in resolving the PM I. We will , however, 
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discuss a five-valued system of logic in the next section and will evalute how 
much help, if any, we achieve from it in resolving PM I. 
2.3 Morgan's Five-valued Logic: There are various many-valued logics with 
different numbers of values. To serve our purpose, here, we will consider a model 
of five-valued logic described by Charles G. Morgan. In this five-valued logic, we 
see five different values. These a re-T for 'logically true', t for 'empirically true, U 
for 'undeterminable', f for 'empirically false' and F for 'logically false'. Among 
those only T and t are designated values and all others are undesignated values. 
The following truth tables for various connectives are offered in this system-
=:::) T t u f F ~ T t u f F v IT t u f F 
T T t u f F T T t f f F T T T T T T 
t t t u f f t T t t f f t T t t t t 
u u u u u u u T t t t t u T t u u u 
f u u u u u .1: T t t t t f T t u f f I 
F u u u u u F T T T T T F IT t u f F 
Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 
Here, we see that the conditional ' =:::)' reflects the view that if the antecedent is 
t rue, then we cannot dec1de th e value of an implication. This is some what new 
idea in this context. But the conditional ·~ · is parallel to the usual material 
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implication. Among various connectives ---,, ~. and v are pseudo-classical 
operators in the sense that if we assign the value 'true' to all designated values 
and the value 'false ' to all undesignated values, then the truth conditions for these 
operators correspond to that of classical logic. But the connectives - and ::::> are 
not pseudo-classical. They offer a new type of truth values for implication. In the 
next section we will check whether this new type of truth conditions may help us 
in resolving PMI. 
Five-valued Logic and Paradoxes of Material Implication: The truth table for 
::::> in the above five-valued model is an advance in resolving the paradoxes in the 
sense that it turns those paradoxical statements into 'undeterminable' instead of 
theorems. Let us check, for example, the positive paradox p::::>(q::::>p). It can easily 
be shown that the truth value of this statement is undeterminable when any of the 
components of it is false or undeterminable. Let p be false and q be true. We can, 
now, construct the following matrix according to this system-
p::::>( q::::>p) 
F ::::> (T ::::> F ) 
F::::>F 
U (undeterminable) 
Thus, although it does not falsify the positive paradox, it turns it into 
undeterminable. Hence pos itive paradox, i.e . p::::>(q::::>p), is no longer a theorem in 
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this system. In this way, we can show that other PMI are turned into 
undeterminable in this system of five-valued logic. Since no PMI is true in five-
valued logic, they are not theorems in this system. Moreover, this five-valued 
logic shows that a true statement implies any true or false or undeterminable 
statement, whereas a true statement is implied only by a true statement, and a 
false statement does not imply any true or false statement. Thus the principles 
which cause the PMI-(a) a true statement is implied by any statement whatever, 
and (b) a false statement implies any statement whatever-are gone. Rather, this 
five-valued logic establishes some alternative principles-
1. A true statement is implied only by a true statement 
2. A false statement does not imply any true or false statement 
None of these alternative principles include the PMI as theorems in this system. 
Undoubtedly, it is an advance in resolving these paradoxes. But still there is a big 
problem. The problem is that this five-valued logic resolves PMI at a very high 
cost. Not only the PM I, but most of the other theorems containing the connective 
=:J also become undeterminable in this system. We can consider Modus Ponens 
(MP) here. It is a theorem in standard logic and acceptable as a valid form of 
inference intuitively and important from mathematical perspective. But in this five-
valued system Modus Ponens also becomes undeterminable instead of being 
true for every substitution instances. We can construct the matrix in this way: If 
p~q and p, then q (M P ); it can be re-translated as [(p=:Jq)•p]=:Jq. Now, 
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[(T=:JF)•T]=:JF = U=:JF = U (undeterminable), when p is true and q is false. Since 
MP becomes undeterminable, it is no longer a theorem in this system. Similarly, 
other theorems containing the 'non pseudo-classical' connectives -, =:J become 
undeterminable and hence not theorems in five valued system. Thus the whole 
system of propositional calculus collapses in this five-valued system of logic. Very 
few logicians, if any, will agree to accept this system at the cost of so many 
theorems and propositional calculus. 
There is another problem. it is well-know that an argument must be either valid or 
invalid. There is no third option for an argument between being valid or invalid. 
Now the question is, what will be the status of an argument from the perspective 
of validity which has an undeterminable value as its premiss or conclusion or as 
both? Introducing a third option, such that 'undeterminable argument' or 
something like that, will not be acceptable. Validity or invalidity of an argument is 
completely a formal matter. An argument is valid if its premisses deduce the 
conclusion and invalid if its premisses do not deduce its conclusion. It is 
unreasonable to think that there may be arguments in which premisses neither 
deduce the conclusion nor 'not deduce' the conclusion. Thus the option for a third 
category from the perspective of validity is impossible. To escape from this 
problem one might wish to categorize this sort of argument, which contains 
undeterminable value either in its premisses or in its conclusion, as valid or 
invalid. But this wiil not do. Suppose, the premiss of the argument \f' is 
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undeterminable and the conclusion is false. In this case the argument could be 
valid if the premisses were false, and \f' could be invalid if the premisses were 
true. So, we cannot categorize it in either of categories-valid or invalid. Similar 
problems will arise in the case of arguments which have true premisses and 
undeterminable conclusions, or which have undeterminable premisses and 
undeterminable conclusions. Thus five-valued logic destroys the way of judging 
validity of arguments while it resolves the PMI. It is hard to accept this solution at 
such a high price. 
2.4 Comments: So, we have seen in this chapter that three-valued logic contains 
all the paradoxes of material implication as theorems, although it introduces a 
third value-indeterminate. It fails to offer any solution for PMI, because it 
preserves the truth table of implication of standard two-valued logic. The five-
valued logic described by C G. Morgan offers solution of the paradoxes by 
turning those paradoxical statements into undeterminable instead of theorems. 
Nonetheless this solution is not convincing, since it takes such a high price that 
most of the logicians will not agree to accept it. Thus, we are finally obligated to 
take the unfortunate conclusion in this chapter that many valued logic does not 
offer any convincing solution to the paradoxes of material implication 
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Chapter 3 
Modal Logic 
Modal logic is a branch of logic that deals with expressions containing modal 
features such as 'necessarily', 'possibly', 'contingently', 'can', 'could', 'may', 
'must', 'might', 'have to' and so on. Those expressions are often termed as a/ethic 
modifiers. This term has come from the Greek word alethea which means truth. 
These above mentioned words are said to express alethic modalities. In other 
words those expressions express various modes of truth. Modal logic, in its 
narrow sense, is the study of the syntax and semantics of alethic modalities.21 
Modern modal logic emerged as a response to the PMI. American logician 
Clarence Irving Lewis was the pioneer of modern modal logic. He introduced the 
idea of strict implication based on modal features. The idea of strict implication 
rejects the well-known PM I, p=>( q::>p) and -p( q=>p ). Thus modal logic has some 
promise in resolving the PMI, and hence modal logic is relevant to our project. 
There are various models and systems in modal logics, such as K, 0, T, M, B, 
S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 etc. Of course, our aim in this chapter is not to make an 
overall study about various kinds and systems of modal logic. Our aim in this 
chapter is to search whether there is any solution for PMI in modal logic. So, we 
will discuss here the nature of modal logic (more specifically, propositional modal 
logic) in general with emphasis on alethic modal logic along with the historical 
background of modal logic, and above all Clarence Irving Lewis'(1883-1 964) idea 
about strict implication. These are the topics which are very much relevant to our 
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main project, i.e. finding a solution of PMI, if there is any, within the scope of 
modal logic. 
3.1 Historical Background: Modal logic is not, in fact, a new branch of logic. 
Rather, in the ancient period philosophers showed considerable interest in this 
area. Aristotle's treatise De lnterpretatione consists of two chapters about 
modality. "Aristotle determines in De lnterpretatione, for example, that 'it may be' 
and 'It cannot be' are contradictories, as are 'It may not be' and 'It cannot be'. 
Furthermore, 'from the proposition "It may be" it follows that it is not impossible' 
and in one sense 'the proposition "It may be" follows from the proposition "It is 
necessary that it should be". In another sense (which we might gloss as 'It is 
merely possible that'), 'It may be is logically incompatible with ' It is necessary that 
it should be' . "22 Clearly those were the pioneering discussions of modal logic. A 
similar discussion also occupied a substantial part of Aristotle's another classic 
Prior Analytics. In the middle age it was again studied by the Arab and the 
Christian logicians. Although modal features (such as necessity, possibility, 
impossibility and so on) are very important topics in philosophy and always play a 
significant role in philosophical discourse, modal logic found little place in 
nineteenth and early twentieth century mathematical logic.23 It was American 
logician C. I. Lewis who brought modal logic into the light once again in 1932. 
Lewis reintroduced modal log ic while he was criticizing the two basic paradoxes 
of materia l implication (PM I)- p ::::::) (q::::::) p) and - p ::::::) (p ::::::) q) - which are accepted 
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as theorems in Whitehead and Russell's treatise Principia Mathematica. Lewis 
maintains that these two statements are false with respect to more natural strict 
sense of implication. Thus he develops an alternative system based on modal 
features of propositions, namely strict implication (we will discuss about it in 
section 3.4.1 ). Lewis offers five different axiom systems for his logic of strict 
implication. All of these systems are based on the modal features of propositions. 
After Lewis modal logic is enriched with the contribution of Carnap, Kanger, 
Montague, Hintikka, Von Wright, Saul Aaron Kripke and others. Some alternative 
modal systems and models have been developed by them. In fact, modal logic is 
nowadays one of the most actively pursued branches of contemporary 
mathematical logic. 
3.2 Basic Nature of Modal Logic: It is difficult to give a concise definition of 
modal logic, because there are many different modal systems and models. The 
best way of understanding modal logic, thus, is to give some general account of 
modal notions. The basic modal notions are the ideas of 'necessity', 'possibility' , 
'impossibility' and 'contingency' . By necessity, here, we mean logical necessity. 
And by logical necessity 'we do not mean that, things being as they are, or the 
world being as it is, it cannot fail to be true; but rather that it could not fail to be 
true no matter how things were, or no matter what the world turned out to be 
like. '24 Thus the statement that 'no body can travel faster than light' is not 
necessary, although there is scientific evidence that it is not possible for a body to 
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travel faster than light. This statement is not necessary because it is only 
supported by the facts about the physical universe as it is. But it can be claimed, 
at least theoretically, that the physical universe might have been other than in fact 
it is. On the other hand, statements, such as 'all bachelors are unmarried' or 
'there is no round square', are true no matter how things are, or what the world 
turned to be like. In every case, in other words in any possible world (we will 
discuss about the idea of possible world in the section 3.3.2), these statements 
are true. Thus these statements are necessarily true. Similarly, by 'possibility', we 
mean logical possibility. By 'impossibility', we mean logical impossibility, and by 
'contingency', we mean logical contingency. It should be noted here that to 
understand possibility and necessity, modal logicians use 'possible worlds idiom' 
as a powerful analytic tool of interpretation of modal logic. A possible world is a 
way that the world might have been. According to this interpretation, if a 
statement is true in all possible worlds, then it is a necessary truth. If a statement 
happens to be true in our actual world, but is not true in all possible worlds, then it 
is a contingent truth. And a statement which is true in some possible worlds (not 
necessarily our own world) is called a possible truth. These four basic modal 
notions. i.e. necessity, possibility, impossibility and contingency are closely 
related to each other, and any of them can be defined or explained by any of the 
others. For example, to say that the statement p is necessarily true can be 
explained as or can alternatively be expressed as 'it is not possible that p is 
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false'. Similarly, to say that the statement p is possible is to say that 'it is not a 
necessary truth that p is false'. There is, however, another important modal 
notion-entailment. To say that the statement p entails the statement q, is simply 
an alternative way of saying that 'q logically follows from p' or that the inference 
from p to q is logically valid.25 Thus we find five basic modal notions which can be 
expressed briefly in the following way-
> Necessary: If it could not possibly false. 
> Possible: If it might be true (whether it is actually true or actually false). 
> Impossible: If it is necessarily false. 
> Contingent: If it is not necessarily true, that is, possibly true and possibly 
false. 
> Entailment: 'p entails q' means 'q logically follows from p' 
Among the above mentioned modal notions necessity and possibility are the 
basic modal operators. Logicians introduce a square-shaped symbol, D 
I 
(sometimes L), for necessity, and a diamond-shaped symbol, 0 (sometimes M), 
for possibility. Thus 'p is necessary' is symbolized as Dp, and 'q is possible' is 
symbolized as Oq. The other basic modal operator is ,-<,which is used for logical 
entailment. Thus 'p logically entails q' is symbolized as p -< q. The symbol D and 
0 are classified as monadic operators as these deal with single statement while 
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the symbol -< is classified as a dyadic operator, because it expresses a relation 
between two statements. 
We have mentioned earlier that there is a close connection .between necessity 
and possibility. According to that interpretation the statement 'p is necessary' is 
equivalent to 'it is not possible that not p'. And, similarly, 'p is possible' is 
equivalent to the statement 'it is not necessary that not p'. Thus we find the 
following valid equivalences-
Op=-- 0 --p 
Any system containing these equivalences does not need to have both of the 
primitives o, 0 . A system can take o as primitive and introduce 0 by the 
definition-
0 a =def-- 0-- a 
Similarly, a system can take 0 as primitive and introduce 0 by definition-
\ 
0 a =def'"" 0 -- a 
A system which takes o as a primitive is called 0 -based (L-based) system. And a 
system that takes 0 is primitive is called 0-based (M-based) system.26 And, in 
case of entailment, there is controversy about the correct analysis of it. But one 
thing is not disputed that whenever p entails q, it is impossible that p should be 
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true without q's being true too. Thus the entailment relation, -<, holds between p 
and q when and only when it is impossible for p to be true without q's being 
true. 27 So, we have a valid equivalence-
(p -< q) = - 0 (p . -q) 
Hence, we can define entailment, a -< J3, in the following way-
Of course, entailment, a-< J3, can also be defined as-
(a -< J3) =det 0 (a ::::> J3) 
Since, -O(a · -J3) can easily be transformed into O(a ==>J3) by the definition 
(mentioned above) Oa= - 0 - a and standard propositional calculus equivalences. 
It should be noted here that modal logic includes all the wffs of standard 
propositional calculus with their same interpretation adding modal operators to 
them. Indeed, C.l. Lewis constructed the first axioms system for modal logic by 
adding modal operators with wffs of propositional calculus. He proposed several 
nonequivalent modal systems using these axioms. Most of the modal systems, 
which are developed after Lewis, are based on Lewis' systems indeed. 
Considering the significance of Lewis' systems, we would like to list some of his 
axioms of which the first eleven are used in developing the modal system S 1 
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through S5.28 In this list the propositional calculus analogue (sentential logic 
analogue) of the respective modal axioms are also given. 
Modal Axiom Sentential Logic Analogue 
( 1) (p -q)-< (q ·P) (p . q) => (q . p) (Comm) 
(2) (p . q)-< p (p . q) => p (Simp) 
(3) p-< (p . q) P=>(P·P) (Taut) 
(4) [ (p . q) · r] -< [p · ( q · r)] [ (p · q) · r] => [p · ( q · r)] (Assoc) 
(5) p-<- -p P=>--P (ON) 
(6) [(p -< q) · (q-< r)] -< (p-< r) [(p => q) . (q => r)] => (p => r) (HS) 
(7) [p . (p -< q)] -< q 
(8) 0 (p . q)-< 0 p 
(9) (p -< q) -< (- 0 q -< ,_, 0 p) 
(1 0) :J p-< OD p 
( 11) Op-<-0-0p 
(12) p-<-0-0p 
(13) OOp 
Among those axioms the system S 1 contains the first seven axioms. The system 
S2 contains the first seven axioms and the axiom no. 8; the system S3 contains 
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the first seven axioms and the axiom no. 9; the system S4 contains the first 
seven axioms and the axiom no. 1 0; the system S5 contains the first seven 
axioms and the axiom no. 11. All theorems of S 1 are theorems of S2, and all 
theorems of S2 are theorems of S3 and so on, but not vice versa. Thus, systems 
get stronger and stronger from S 1 to S5 gradually. Among all those systems S4 
and S5 are the most significant modal systems. The following two formulas are 
derivable from S4-
OA=OOA 
OA=OOA 
These formulas help us to substitute any formula with a string of iterated modal 
operators (e.g. o o o o o A) by a formula in which the relevant string is replaced 
by a single occurrence of the modal operators in question. And, similarly, the 
following formulas are derivable from S5-
0A=OOA 
OA=O OA 
These two formulas help us to replace any formula containing a string of two or 
more modal operators, whether the same or different (e.g. 0 o 0 0 0 olA), with a 
relevant formula containing only one, that is, the last operator of the string. These 
procedures of replacement of modal formulas help modal logicians to find out 
easy procedures of natural deduction in modal system. 
3.3 Strict Implication: Now we have come to our focus point of this chapter-
strict implication. C. I. Lewis introduced the idea of strict implication because of 
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his dissatisfaction with Russell and Whitehead's idea of material implication 
stated in their treatise Principia Mathematica. Lewis says, "However, I was 
troubled from the first by the presence in the logic of Principia of the theorems 
peculiar to material implication ... "29 In Principia the material implication p :::J q is 
considered false if p is true and q is false, otherwise the implication is true. Thus, 
if the consequent of an implicative statement is true, then the implication is true, 
no matter what is the truth value of the antecedent. Again, if the antecedent of an 
implicative statement is false, then the implication is true, no matter what is the 
truth value of the consequent. In other words, Russell and Whitehead's logic 
includes paradoxical formulas as theorems-(1) a true statement is implied by 
any statement whatever (symbolically: p :::J (q::::) p) ), and (2) a false statement is 
implied by any statement whatever (symbolically: -- p ::::) (p ::::) q) ). These are the 
theorems which are 'peculiar to material implication' in Lewis' view. These 
paradoxical theorems are called paradoxes of material implication (PMI).There 
are many other PM I in Russell and Whitehead's system, but these two are the 
best known among them. We have already discussed about those paradoxes in 
the first chapter of this paper (section 1.1.3), and that's why we are not describing 
those paradoxes here once again. However, Lewis suggests that p strictly implies 
q only if it not merely happens not to be the case that p is true and q is false but 
could not to be the case that p is true and q is false. That is, 'p strictly implies q' 
does not merely means 'Not (p and not-q). Rather, it means 'Not possibly (p and 
not-q). Thus, 'p strictly implies q' includes modal operator 'possible' (0). Lewis 
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introduces the new symbol, -<, for his strict implication. So, 'p strictly implies q' is 
symbolized as: p -< q, and the equivalence will be like this: p -< q = - 0 (p · - q). 
Hence, Lewis' strict implication can be defined in the following way-
a -< ~ =def - 0 (a · - ~) 
This definition of strict implication is adopted in modal system S4 and S5. 
Apparently, this interpretation of strict implication resolves the PMI. Here, it is not 
claimed that the falsehood of the antecedent makes the strict implication true. 
The claim of strict implication is that although the falsehood of p does not suffice 
to verify the strict implication 'If p, then q', its impossibility does. Because if p 
cannot be true at all, it is not possible to have a combination of p's truth with q's 
falsehood. Similarly, here, it is not claimed that the truth of the consequent makes 
the strict implication true. In this case, the claim of strict implication is that 
although the truth of q does not suffice to verify the strict implication 'If p, then q', 
its necessity does, for if q cannot be false at all, it is not possible to have the 
combination of q's falsehood with p's truth. 30 Hence, the basic paradoxes are 
gone. Moreover, it includes the necessity of the consequent. Thus we find at least 
two advantages of strict implication: 
• The paradoxes do not hold for-<. i.e. it is not the case that - p -< (p -< q) 
or that p-< (q-< p). 
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• Strict implication captures the idea of necessitation. When p strictly 
implies q, then the truth of p necessitates the truth of q. 
3.4 Paradoxes of Strict Implication: It sounds as if the idea of strict implication 
resolves the PMI. But the problem is that strict implication, unfortunately, has 
some paradoxes of its own. We have already seen that (1) an impossible 
statement strictly implies any statement whatever, and (2) a necessary statement 
is implied by any statement whatever. These are the two basic paradoxes of strict 
implication which are analogous to the two basic PM I. Thus, any statement of the 
form (p · - p ), i.e. an impossible statement, strictly implies any statement q. 
Similarly, any statement of the form, (p v q), i.e. a necessary statement, is 
implied by any statement q. These two well-known paradoxes of strict implication 
can be expressed symbolically in the following way: 
(p.- p)-< q 
q-<(pv-p) 
Proofs for the Paradoxes of Strict Implication: These paradoxes of strict 
implication can easily be proved by following some quite ordinary, intuitively valid 
and non-paradoxical rules. These rules are-
1. Any conjunction implies (even strictly) each of its conjuncts. This rule 
is well-known as simplification. In Russellian notation it is expressed 
as (p · q) ::::> p, and in Polish notation it can be expressed as KpqCp 
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2. Any statement, p, implies (even strictly) p v q, no matter what q may 
be. This rule is known as addition. In Russellian notation it is 
expressed as p ::::) (p v q), and in the Polish notation it can be 
expressed as CpApq 
3. The statement (p v q) and - p together implied (even strictly) q. This 
rule is known as disjunctive syllogism. In Russellian notation it is 
expressed as [(p v q) . - p] ::::) q, and it can be expressed in Polish 
notation as KApqNpCq. 
4. Whenever p implies (even strictly) q and q implies (even strictly) r, 
then p implies (even strictly) r. This is known as the hypothetical 
syllogism. In Russellian notation it is expressed as [(p::::) q) · (q::::) r)] => 
(p ::::) r), and in Polish notation it can be expressed as KCpqCqrCpr. 
Now by using these rules we can derive any arbitrary statement, q, from any 
impossible statement of the form (p · - p ). Here we are presenting the proof of it 
following I. M. Copi's style of natural deduction:31 
1 0 p 0 -p 
2. p 
3. -p 
4. pvq 
5. q 
6. (p 0- p)-< q 
[1, Simplification; rule 1 mentioned above] 
[1, Simplification] 
[2, Addition; rule 2 mentioned above] 
[4,3 Disjunctive Syllogism; rule 3 mentioned above] 
[1-5, Conditional proof] 
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Thus, Lewis' strict implication includes the paradoxical statement (p · - p) -< q as 
a theorem. This is the paradox which is well-known as ex fa/so quodlibet. A 
similar proof can be constructed for the contention that the necessary the 
necessary proposition (p v- p) follows from any propostion a~ all, say q. That is, 
the paradoxical statement q --< (p v - p) is also included as a theorem in Lewis' 
system. Moreover, we can show that some other paradoxical statements, such as 
- 0 p -< (p -< q), o q -< (p -< q) etc., are also included in Lewis' systems S4 and S5. 
Lewis' Self-defence: It is fact that Lewis himself was not comfortable with these 
paradoxes of strict implication. But he had no way of escaping from them. He 
thought that if ex fa/so quodlibet [(p ·- p)-< q] was false, then the proof for it was 
#' 
defective. But it was clear to him that the proof was constructed following the 
proper procedure of natural deduction. So, if there was any defect, it had to be in 
the rules which were followed in constructing the proof. But there is, in fact, no 
debate about the acceptance of those rules. Those rules are intuitively valid and 
are accepted by all systems of logic. Thus Lewis took the decision that\ there was 
no defect at all. He thought that some paradoxes, such as ex fa/so quodlibet, are 
unavoidable properties of implication in general. These unavoidable properties 
are also properties of his strict implication. And that's why those paradoxes 
become theorem in his strict implication. So, Lewis satisfied himself by saying, 
"There was no way to avoid the principles stated by these unexpected theorems 
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without giving up so many generally accepted laws as to leave it dubious that we 
could have any formal logic at all."32 Some authors and commentators are also 
sympathetic to Lewis' position. Thus Hughes and Cresswell comment that it will 
be more harmful for formal logic to abandon any of these generally accepted and 
intuitively valid rules than to adopt the paradoxes of strict implication as 
theorems. They says, "This derivation33 shows that the price which has to be paid 
for denying that (p · - p) entails q is the abandonment of at least one of A-034. 
Frankly, this price seems to us exorbitantly high, since all of A-D seem intuitively 
sound and the principle that (p · - p) entails q is at worst an innocent one: it could 
never lead us astray in practice by taking us from a true premiss to a false 
conclusion, since no proposition of the form (p.- p) can ever be true."35 
3.5 Comments: Thus, we see, Lewis' systems and modal logic as well show 
some primary success in avoiding the PMI, but these systems include paradoxes 
of strict implication which are almost same as the PMI. So, modal logic and the 
device, strict implication, are not really successful in resolving the PMI for what 
I 
we are trying to. Lewis and some other modal logicians try to console themselves 
by declaring that there is no way to avoid the paradoxes of strict implication 
without making formal logic impossible. But the situation is not that much drastic 
as Lewis and some other modal logicians think. There is a still hope to develop 
formal logic without adopting these paradoxes as theorems. And, there are some 
logicians who involve themselves in developing such system for formal logic. 
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Establishment of relevance logic is the most renowned attempt in finding such 
logic. Since we have not found any convincing solution of the PMI in strict 
implication and modal logic as well, we will discuss relevance logic in the next 
chapter in order to search whether it has any solution to the PMI or not. 
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Chapter 4 
Relevance Logic 
Relevance logic is a form of non-classical logic in which relevance between the 
antecedent and consequent, in case of true implication, is required. The term 
'relevance logic' is popularly used by North American logicians. British and 
Australian logicians generally use the term 'relevant logic' for it. In classical logic 
and non-classical logic so far discussed there are a lot of formulae in which 
relevance between antecedent and consequent is not required. In contrast, in 
relevance logic an argument is valid only if there is some relevant connection 
between the premisses and the conclusion. Similarly, in this system an 
implication is true only if there is relevant connection between the antecedent and 
the consequent. We have seen in our earlier discussion that the main cause of 
the PM I is that there are implications where there is no relevance between 
antecedent and consequent. As relevance logic accepts implications which have 
relevance between antecedent and consequent, it is expected that this system of 
\ 
logic can contribute to resolving the PM I. In this chapter we will discuss relevance 
logic and see how this system tries to resolve the PM I. 
4.1 Historical Background: Relevance logic is a comparatively recent branch of 
non-classical logic. It was born in 1950s. A.R Anderson and N.D Belnap are the 
pioneers of this logic. They were inspired by the paper BegrOndung einer 
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strengen lmplikation (A Foundation for a Rigorous Implication) by Wilhelm 
Ackermann. By the term 'Rigorous Implication' Ackermann expressed the idea 
that in case of A~B. a logical connection holds between A and B, that the 
content of B is part of the content of A. He rejected some of the valid formulas of 
classical logic, which are in fact paradoxical, on the ground that the truth of A has 
nothing to do with the question whether there is a logical connection between B 
and A.36 Belnap was fascinated with Ackermann's ideas, and was looking for 
other logicians, if there were any, who were interested in Ackermann's ideas. 
Very soon he met Anderson who was equally fascinated with Ackermann and 
they started working together and develop relevance logic. 
4.2 Basic Tenets of Relevance Logic: The basic tenet of relevance logic is that 
it is possible to eliminate the paradoxes of material implication by introducing 
'relevance between antecedent and consequent' as a requirement for a true 
implication. Among those paradoxes p:::>(q:::>p) and -p:::>(p:::>q) are well-known. 
Modal logicians tried to resolve these paradoxes by using the deviqe of strict 
implication. But strict implication has paradoxes of its own. Among the paradoxes 
of strict implication (p.-p)-<q amd q-<(pv-p) are well-known. Relevance logicians 
claim that the source of the PMI and the paradoxes of strict implication lies in the 
fact that in each of them the antecedent seems irrelevant to the consequent. As a 
result the antecedent does not entail the consequent. Moreover, there are other 
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implications, which are valid in classical logic, that are reasonably proved invalid 
in relevance logic. For example, the implication: 
If the moon is made of green cheese, then Bangladesh is in Asia. 
In this type of implication, there is also a failure of relevance. Here the 
consequent has nothing to do with antecedent. Relevance logic rejects this sort 
of implication, which commits the fallacy of relevance. 
4.3 Semantics in Relevance Logic: At the time of its emergence, relevance 
logic was criticized for not having semantics. But in 1970s Urquhart, Fine, 
Routley and Meyer, and others developed semantics for relevance logic. In this 
section we will discuss the semantics for relevance logic following Urquhart. 
Urquhart introduces the notion of pieces information. "A piece of information is a 
concept which encompasses but is more general than that of a possible world or 
an evidential situation."37 He introduces another concept-satisfaction relation. 
Pieces of information satisfy statements. "The satisfaction relation ( J=) holds 
I 
between pieces of information and basic statements of a language by virtue of 
the meaning of those basic statements."38 Thus if a is a piece of information that 
consists the fact that AI is older then John and the fact that John is older than Bill, 
then the piece of information satisfies the statement-
a J= AI is older than Bill 
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Thus those facts which can be satisfied by pieces of information are called 
informational link. Various types of natural laws, scientific truths, conventions are 
among informational links. Thus 'all bodies attract is other' can work as an 
informational link. These informational links provide the truth makers for 
implicative statements.39 
4.4 Semantics and Implication in Relevance Logic: The relation between 
implicative statements and the informational link is transitive. Suppose it is a law 
of nature that a that A----+8 obtains in a and 8----+C is also hold in a, then it seems 
that a F A----+C although there is no direct informational link between A and C. 
Thus, implication seems to be transitive by virtue of its meaning.40 However, 
.... 
pieces of information can be combined together. This procedure is called fusion. 
The fusion of two pieces of information a and b is written as: 
And, of course, aob itself a piece of information. When two pieces of information 
\ 
are fused together, an informational link is applied from one piece of information 
to the other. For example, if a is a piece of information that all bodies attract other 
bodies, and b is a piece of information that p and q are bodies, then in aob we 
have the fact that p and q attracts one another. Thus, putting the connection 
between informational link and implication together, we can derive the following 
truth condition for implication:41 
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a F A~B if and only if V b (b fA => aob f B) 
That is, when a piece of information, which satisfies the antecedent, is fused with 
another piece of information, then if the fusion satisfies the consequent, the 
implication is then true. 
4.5 Proof Theory for Relevance Logic: Anderson and Belnap introduce a proof 
theory for relevance logic which is based on Fitch's natural deduction system. 
The system is simple. Each premiss or hypothesis in a proof is indexed by 
number. The various steps in proof are indexed by the number of the premisses 
which are used to derive the steps. An example of this type of proof may help us 
to understand this technique: 
1. A{1} 
2. (A~B){2} 
3. 8{1 ,2} 
4. ((A~B)~B){1} 
5. A~((A~B)~B) 
hyp. 
hyp. 
1,2~E 
2-3 ~I 
1-4 ~I 
The numbers in brackets in this proof indicate the assumptions used to prove the 
formula. These numbers are called indices. "The idea here is that for an 
assumption to be counted as helping to generate the conclusion, an index 
denoting the assumption must be appear in the deduction and at some later point 
be discharged. This ensures that each premise is really used in the deduction. 
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This natural deduction system gives an intuitive understanding of relevance in 
proofs."42 In this system all assumptions stated must be used and indices keep 
track of which assumptions are used. 
Proof Theory and PMI: Relevance logic was developed to avoid the PMI. But it 
does not prove that all the PMI are false in every circumstance. But relevance 
logic's advantage is that it does not force the paradoxes to be true. We can 
consider, for example, the positive paradox, A~(B~A). Here is an attempt of 
constructing a proof for this-
1. A{1} hyp. 
2. B{2} hyp. 
3. A{1} 1 , reiteration 
4. B~A{1} 2.3~1 
5. A~(B~A)q, 1-4 ~I 
In the fourth step of this so-called proof, there is an illegitimate move. 2 does not 
belong to {1 }. That is why the second hypothesis cannot be discharged here. 
Thus the proof is not correct. Hence A~(B~A) is not a formula in this system. 
The other PMI are also avoided in this way. 
4.6 Comments: Thus, we see, relevance logic helps us avoid the PMI. But 
relevance logic has a short coming that it is not truth functional. Relevance logic 
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is not truth functional in the sense that the truth value of a statement in this 
system does not depend on the truth values of its components. In other words, 
the truth value of p~q does not depend only on the truth values of p and q. 
Rather, it depends on" the pieces of information and informational links that satisfy 
the components. These pieces of information and informational links make 
antecedent and consequent relevant to each other. A concrete example may help 
us to understand this point. The statement 'If snow is white, then Rome is in Italy' 
is false, in this system of logic, because its antecedent and consequent are 
irrelevant to each other. Although both of the components of this implication are 
true, the pieces of information and informational link of this statement does not 
make antecedent and consequent relevant. That's why this implication is 
considered as false in relevance logic, although it is true in other systems of logic. 
Thus, it is clear that relevance logic deals with the content of statements, not with 
just the form. Hence the relevance logic is not truth functional. So, if we accept 
relevance logic, we have to give up traditional truth table and various truth 
functional devices of standard logic. For this reason many logicians does not 
admit relevance logic as a satisfactory system of logic. 
But for the present purpose, we can still consider relevance logic as an 
acceptable system of logic of entailment because it not only rejects all the PMI, 
but also rejects those silly implications (such as: If Socrates is a philosopher, then 
snow is white) where antecedents and consequents are not relevant to each 
Page-55 
other. This system satisfies all the criteria we have sat up for an adequate logic of 
implication . Despite the above criticism, these advantages make relevance logic 
more satisfactory than the other system of logic discussed in this paper. 
~~~ 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
We have discussed the nature of material implication and the paradoxes related 
to it. In search of the solution of these paradoxes we have discussed three main 
schools of modern logic: many-valued logic, modal logic and relevance logic. Our 
aim was to find an adequate system of logic which is free from these paradoxes. 
We set up two criteria for such a system of logic: (1) the adequate system of logic 
of implication should not adopt the PMI as theorems. That is, this system should 
not prove those paradoxical statements as true, and (2) In this system, there 
must be relevance between the antecedent and consequent of a true implicative 
statement, so that the antecedent entails the consequent. Now, we will look back 
to our previous discussion and try to find out which system, if there is any, does 
satisfy these criteria. 
First. we have to look back towards many-vaiuea logic. ln our paper, we have 
discussed two types of many-vaiued logic-three-valued logic and five-valued 
logic. Three-valued logic rejects traditional bivalence, the law of excluded middle 
and the law of non-contradiction by introducing a third value-the indeterminate. 
Further, the three-valued logic developed a new type of truth tables adopting this 
third value. The rejections of traditional bivalence. the law of excluded middle and 
the !aw of non-contradicTion are aavances regaraing the solution to the PMI in the 
sense that those conceotJons are some of the ma1n causes of the PM I, as we 
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saw in the Chapter 1. However the rejections of traditional bivalence, the law of 
excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction, and the introduction of 
indeterminate value are not enough to resolving the PMI. Although three-valued 
logic rejects traditional bivalence, it adopts the intact truth table of implication 
based on traditional bivalence in its new truth table. And we know that the truth 
table of implication in standard logic causes the PMI. By adopting this truth table 
three-valued logic, in fact, adopts all the PMI in it. That is why all the PMI, such 
as p~(q~p), are theorems in this system. So, it fails to resolve the PMI. But we 
must admit three-valued logic's historical significance in this regard as it is the 
first attempt, in the modern period, to resolve such logical problems beyond 
standard logic. 
Five-valued logic, another school of many-valued logic, shows more promise than 
three-valued logic in resolving the PMI. It develops different types of truth tables 
with five different values. One success of five-vaiued logic is that all the PMI are 
vaiued as 'indeterminate' ins-reaa of ·true' in this system, although it does not 
falsify those paradoxes. So, the PMI are not, at least, theorems in this system. 
From this point of vievv. five-valued logic satisfies our first criterion of an adequate 
logic of implication. But still there is a big problem. Five-valued logic also makes 
'indeterminate' many other weil-established, mathematically significant and 
intuitively valid theorems. sucn as moaus ponens. along with PMI. In fact, almost 
a ll t:he theorems conta1nmg the connectives - ana ~ become 'indeterminate' and 
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hence not theorems in five-valued logic. Thus the whole procedure of 
propositional calcuius breaks down in this system. Moreover, five-valued logic is 
not compatible with the validation process of arguments. An argument is invalid if 
its premisses are true but the conclusion is false. Otherwise the argument is 
valid. Now, if either the premisses or the conclusion of a given argument is 
'indeterminate', there is no way of judging its validity/invalidity. In other words, 
five-valued logic destroys the way of judging the validity/invalidity of arguments. 
So, we see, five-valued logic collapses the whole system of propositional calculus 
and the system of judging the validity of arguments, while it tries to resolve the 
PM I. It is difficult to accept five-valued logic at such a high price. It should also be 
noted here that five-valued logic does not offer any device to establish relevance 
between the antecedent and consequent of implicative statements. That is, it 
does not make sure that in a true implication the antecedent will entail the 
consequent. So, it does not satisfy our second criterion for an adequate system 
of the logic of implication. Hence, we reject five-vaiuea iogic as an adequate 
system of logic of implication. 
Modal logic is also inadequate. It emerged as a response to a dissatisfaction with 
the two bas1c PM I, p=:J( q~p) and -p=:J(p=:Jq), which are accepted as theorems in 
\Nhitehead and Russeil's treattse Principia Mathemarica. C.L. Lewis, the pioneer 
of moaern moaal logic. matntatns that these PMI are false w1th respect to a more 
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natural and strict sense of implication. He established the idea of strict implication 
using modal features, which removed the PMI. So, it fulfills our first criterion for 
an adequate logic of implication. Moreover. the device of strict implication 
captures the idea of necessitation in the sense that where p strictly implies q, 
then the truth of p necessitates the truth of q. That is there is some sort of 
relevance between antecedent and consequent. And for this relation of 
necessitation, it can be said that in strict implication the antecedent entails the 
consequent. Thus strict implication satisfies our second criterion for adequate 
logic of implication. 
Thus, it sounds that the strict implication or modal logic resolves the PMI. But the 
unfortunate fact is that, while it resolves PMI , it creates new types of paradoxes, 
namely the paradoxes of strict implication. Two basic paradoxes of strict 
implication are (p .-p )-<.q and q-<.(pv-p). In other words, in this system (1) an 
impossible staTemenr sTrictly imolies any statement whaTever, and (2) a 
necessary statement is impli ed by any statement whatever. Clearly these two 
paradoxes of strict implication are analogous to the two basic PMI, p-:::J(q-:::Jp) and 
-p-=:;(p-:::Jq). Thus the strict implication of modal logic does not resolve the PMI in a 
true sense. Of course. Lewis himself was not comfonable with these paradoxes 
of sTrict implication, but he fa11ed to escape from them. tVloreover he showed that 
there w ere valid Procedures oi denvatlon wni cn provea these paradoxes of stnct 
imolication as vaiia Nniie aeoenaing only on some generally acceptea ana 
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intuitively valid rules. Lewis argued that if we do not want to accept these 
paradoxes of strict implication as theorems, then we have to abandon one or 
some of these generally accepted and intuitively valid rules. But this 
abandonment, according to Lewis and many other modal logicians, will destroy 
the possibility of formal logic. Thus they consoled themselves by declaring that 
there is no way to avoid the paradoxes of strict implication without making formal 
logic impossible. 
Relevance logicians do not consider the situation as drastic as Lewis and others 
think it to be. Those logicians hope to develop a system of formal logic which will 
not adopt the PMI as theorems. They develop relevance logic which is our next 
school of logic to be considered. The fundamental diagnosis of relevance logic is 
that the main source of PMI is that in each case the antecedent seems to be 
irrelevant to the consequent. For this lack of relevance the antecedent does not 
entail the consequent. Relevance logicians claim that it is possible to to solve the 
PMI by introducing 'relevance' between antecedent and consequent. To establish 
this relevance between antecedent and consequent relevance logicians develop 
various devices, such as pieces of information, informational links and fusion. 
These devices connect antecedent with consequent by transmitting information. 
In other words, those devices establish the relevance between antecedent and 
consequent. Thus, in this system the antecedent entails the consequent in any 
t rue implication. So. relevance iogic fulfills our second criterion for the adequate 
!ogic of impiication. 
Page-61 
Relevance logic also developed an alternative proof theory based on Fitch's 
natural deduction system. This system ensures that each premiss is really used 
in a deduction. In this system all assumptions stated must be used in a 
deduction. There is a new device, indices, that keeps track of which assumptions 
are used. This proof theory does not directly disprove the PMI, but it does not 
allow the PMI to be proved valid. In other words, by this proof theory no PMI can 
be proved as valid. Thus no PMI is a theorem in relevance logic. In this way the 
PMI are avoided. So, relevance logic fulfills our first criterion for an adequate 
logic of implication. Moreover, relevance logic reasonably rejects other kinds of 
implications which are not paradoxical and are accepted as valid in standard 
logic, but, in fact, are very silly. The implicative statement, 'If 2+2=4, then Dhaka 
is the capital of Bangladesh' is that kind of silly implication in which there is no 
relevance between antecedent and consequent. The uniqueness of relevance 
logic is that it also rejects this kind of silly implications. It can be said that 
although those silly implications are not paradoxical, they are fallacious. They 
commit the fallacy of relevance. 
Thus. we see. relevance logic satisfies both of the criteria we have set up for an 
adequate logic of implication. Not only that, it does something more by rejecting 
silly implications. Unlike many-valued logic, it does not adopt the PMI or destroy 
the process of judging the validity/invalidity of arguments. And unlike modal logic 
and the device of strict implication. 1t does noT create any new type of paradox 
while it resolves The PMI. Thus relevance logic is a more acceptable logic of 
impiication than any oTher system oi log1c we have discussed. We, of course. do 
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not claim that relevance logic is perfect. There are some problems with it. We 
have already seen that relevance logic is not a truth functional logic. It deals with 
the content, not with just the form. So, if we accept relevance logic, then we have 
to give up traditional truth tables and some other devices based on the truth 
functional characteristic of formal logic. Moreover, although relevance between 
the antecedent and consequent of an implication is the basic requirement in 
relevance logic, no criterion has been set up in relevance logic by which one can 
judge whether any information is really relevant to making the link between the 
antecedent and consequent. Relevance logicians say that natural law, scientific 
truth and conventions are among informational links. But these are examples, not 
really criteria for relevant informational links. We need clear definition and criteria 
for informational links by which we can measure whether a piece of information or 
informational link is relevant to connecting the antecedent and consequent. This 
type of short comings of relevance logic does not, however, make it 
unacceptable. We have already seen that relevance logic fulfills the criteria for an 
adequate logic of implication without introducing any new paradox or without 
creating any new major :)roblem. We should also remember that relevance logic 
is one of the most recen1 branches of non-standard logic. More research is going 
on in this field, and, we hope that relevance logicians will be able to resolve those 
minor problems very soon. So, it is relevance logic which has the potential to be a 
perfect logic of implication by resolving all the paradoxes of material implication. 
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Notes and References: 
1 It should be acknowledged here that many ancient and medieval logicians were concerned 
about the problem of the paradoxes of material implication and tried to solve it. Aristotle's view of 
future contingent statements and epicurean's rejection of traditional bivalence opened the door of 
the development of many-valued logic and modal logic which are concerned to PMI. Stoic 
logicians, such as Philo, Diodorus and Chrysippus, showed their awareness about the problem of 
the PMI. Diodorus sat up the criterion-a conditional proposition is if it neither was nor is possible 
that its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. This criterion has similarity with the modern 
concept of modal logic. Chrysippus also maintained that some propositions are possible, some 
imossible, some necessary, some unnecessary. Clearly, this idea matches with the views of 
modern modal logic. Sometimes it is also claimed that there were echoes of relevance logic in 
Chrysippus views. Although we admit that ancient and medieval logicians developed some views 
about many-valued logic, modal logic and relevance logic concerning the problem of the PMI, in 
this paper we do not discuss their views in details. We have discussed, in this paper, the matter 
from the perspective of modern logic, since modern logic allows us to continue a more thorough 
investigation of the problem by using rigorous tools and axiomatic concepts of the propositional 
calculus developed by Frege and post-Fregian logicians. (See: Mates, Benson(1961 ), Stoic Logic, 
Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; and Bobzien Susanne, Dailectic31 
School, Retreived from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialectical-school, Retreived on July 21, 
2005 .) 
2 I have classified various types of implication following I.M. Copi, see: Copi, Irving M. and Cohen, 
Carl (1994). Introduction to Logic (ninth Edition ), New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
pp.337-40 
3 Copi, Irving M. (1 954 ), Symbolic Logic. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc, p-18 
4 Prior. A.N, "Logic. Modal" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Vol.5, New York, London: The 
Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1967, p.6 
5 In his Principles of Mathematics B. Russell called it 'material implication', but in Principia 
Mathematica and in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy he called it simply 'implication' 
1nstead of 'material implication'. (see: The Principles of Mathemacics, London: Routledge, 1903. 
Reprinted 1992. pp 10-41 & In troduction to Mathematical Philosophy, London: George Allen & 
Unw1n Ltd.1919. 141h rmpressron. 1975, pp 144-154) 
6 Read. Stephen. ··Relevance Logrc and Entailment" in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 
(CO Versron ), Vers1on 1.0. London and New York: Routledge. 1998 
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7 I have developed th1s idea from Professor Jay Foster's (department of Philosophy, MUN) 
comments. I am Indebted to him for this 1dea. 
8 Moore, G.E (Reprint-1965 ). Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, p. 291 
9 Ibid, p.292 
10 Ibid, p.297 
11 Ibid, pp.303-04 
12 Stebbing, L.S (Second Edit. 1950), A Modern Introduction to Logic, London: Methuen & Co. 
Ltd, p.225 
13 Grandy, Richard, "Many-Valued, Free and lntuitionistic Logic" in Jacquette, Dale (Edit, 2002), A 
Companion to Philosophical Logic, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, p.531 
14 Morgan, Charles G., "Many-valued Logic" in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (CD 
Version), Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge, 1998 
15 Grandy, Richard, "Many-Valued, Free and lntuitionistic Logic" in Jacquette, Dale (Edit, 2002), 
op.cit, p.532 
16 Morgan, Charles G., "Many-valued Logic" in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (CD 
Version), Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge, 1998 
17 Ackermann, Robert (1967) An Introduction to Many Valued Logic, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul Ltd, pp.38-39 (Ackermann used the letter m for number of values, but in this paper I have 
used the letter n instead of using m for number of values for convenience.) 
18 
"Philosophische bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen systemen des Assagenkalkuls", Comptes 
rendus des seances de Ia societe des sciences et des lettres de Varsovie, Classe Ill. Vol. xxiii 
(1930), pp.51-77. An English translation of the paper JS given in S. McCall (ed. ), Polish Logic 
1920-1939 (Oxford 1967), pp.40-65 
19 Prior, A. N . "Logic, many-Valued" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Vol.5, New York, 
London: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press , 1967, p.3 
20 Ibid, p.3 
21 Nolt, John (1997), Logics, New York: Wadsworth Publishing Company (An International 
Thomson Company), p.307 
22 Kuhn, Steven T., "Modal Logic" in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (CD version) Version 
1.0. London and New York: Routledge . 1998 
23 lb10 
.::!-l Hughes . G.E & Cresswell, M.J (1968), An lntroaucrion ro Modal Logic. London: Methuen ana 
Co ltd. iJ.23 
_:J lb1d. p.23 
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26 Ibid, p.26 
27 Ibid, p.26 
28 This list of axioms has been taken from: Kahane, Howard (1973), Logic and Philosophy, 
California: Wadsworth Publications Company, Inc., p .348 
29 Lewis, C. I (1930), 'Logic and Pragmatism' in Contemporary American Philosophy, G. P. 
Adams and W. P. Montague (eds.), London: Allen and Unwin, p.32 (_ 
30 Prior. A. N , "Logic, many-Valued" in The Encyclopedia of philosophy, Vol. 5, New York, 
London: The macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1967, p.6 
31 Copi, Irving M. (1973), Symbolic Logic (Fourth Edition), New York: The Macmillan Company, 
pp.30-63 
32 Lewis, C. I (1930), op.cit., p.38 
33 My italic, the term 'derivation' refers to the natural deduction showed in section 4 
34 In this context these are the rules 1-4 described in section 4 
35 Hughes , G.E & Cresswell, M.J (1968), op.cit., p.338 
36 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), CD version (version 1.0), London and New York: 
Routledge, Topic: Relevance logic and entailment 
37 Mares, Edwin, "Relevance Logic" in Jacquette, Dale (Edit, 2002), op.cit. p.612 
38 Ibid, p.612 
39 Ibid, p.612 
40 Ibid. p.612 
41 Ibid, p.612 
42 Maries. Edwin. "Relevance Logic" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (On line version), 
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